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Electronic Tracking Devices and Privacy: See No
Evil, Hear No Evil, But Beware Of Trojan Horses
The danger of unbounded liberty and the danger of bounding it
have produced a problem in the science of government which
human understanding seems hitherto unable to solve.
Dr. Samuel Johnson
INTRODUCTION

In the late 1700's when Dr. Samuel Johnson wrote of the conflict
between "bounded and unbounded liberty" he was unduly optimistic when he implied that the problem was solvable. Two hundred
years later, the attainment of an equilibrium between the needs of
law enforcement and the right to individual privacy continues to
elude human understanding.
Privacy, the right "to be let alone,"' needs to be weighed by the
courts against the long-recognized maxim that "the safety of the
people is the highest law." '2 However, an imbalance exists because
each interest, and the importance attached to each by society, is
dynamic. A change in the boundaries of one will necessarily require
a realignment of the other. A recent challenge to this balance is the
development and use of an electronic surveillance technique known
as the electronic tracking device. This device, colloquially known as
a "beeper," is a battery-operated instrument that emits periodic
signals which when monitored establishes the location of the device
and the object to which it is attached.
In this equation, it appears that the scales are weighted against
even beneficial use of devices with electronic components.' GovernOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"Imprimis interest rei publicae ut pax in regno conservatur." M. HALE,.PLS OF THE
CROWN 53 (1678); see also R. POUND 111, JURISPRUDENCE 292 (1959); L. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTES
158 (1678). This ideological conflict has often been debated by legal authorities as illustrated
by Learned Hand's admonition that "[wihat we need to fear is the archaic formalism and
the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." United
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). In contrast, Professor Amsterdam has
warned that "the history of the destruction of liberty ... has largely been the history of the
relaxation of [procedural] safeguards in the face of plausible-sounding governmental claims
of a need to deal with widely frightening and emotional-freighted threats to the good order
of society." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 354
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
3. The use of magnetometers and x-ray machines to aid the police in detecting objects
has been held to be a search. United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th
1.
2.
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ment abuse of privacy interests through patently illegal use of electronic devices,' public fears concerning the abridgement of constitutionally protected privacy rights, and sympathetic legislative action5 combined, have moved the courts to overcompensate in rulings
involving sense-enhancing law enforcement techniques.'
The clash between law enforcement technology and privacy interests has led to dichotomous rulings regarding constitutionality of
warrantless installation of the electronic tracking device. Although
the beeper is a simple, single-function device, the courts, in analyzing its legal status in relation to privacy infringements, have encountered difficult problems of constitutional analysis. These problems arise from the essentially protean nature of the right to privacy, since few concepts are less amenable to definition or legal
Cir. 1972). Use of a helicopter to view marijuana in a yard not visible from the road has also
been held to constitute a search. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1973).
4. Government excesses in the area of surveillance include the military activities at the
1968 Democratic National Convention, FBI surveillance of various civil rights leaders and of
participants at the 1964 Democratic Convention, wiretapping by the White House
"plumbers" unit, computer compilation of thousands of files at the CIA related to domestic
security, and the maintenance of FBI files on members of Congress. See SENATE SELECT COMM.
ON INTELLIGENCE, SURCOMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF AMEICANS, ELECrONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, S. Doc. No. 3197,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976). [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. ON INTELLIGENCE].
5. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). This Act
governs public access to all records maintained by the federal government. It describes certain
kinds of information which each agency must make available to the public either by publication in the Federal Register or otherwise. In addition, other agency records must be provided
on request where the request "reasonably describes" the records sought and otherwise complies with the Act's procedural rules. The requestor is not required to show any special need
to see the records. Finally, the request must be answered by the agency within ten days (or
twenty under "unusual circumstances"). See also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp.
IV 1974). The Act's purpose is to strengthen an individual's control of the flow of information
about himself by authorizing him to obtain access to it and by restricting its disclosure
without his consent both within and without the government. Comprehensive privacy statutes have also been adopted by seven states: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-801 et seq. (Supp. 1975);
1976 Conn. Pub. Act 76-421 (June 9, 1976); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 66A, §§ 1-3; ch. 30, § 63;
ch. 214, § 3B (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.162 et seq. (1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1347.01-.10, 1347.99 (Page) (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-50-1 et seq. (Supp. 1977);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-377 et seq. (Supp. 1977).
6. Warnings about the adverse consequences of surveillance technology, especially electronic surveillance devices have come from a variety of sources. See Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 340 (1966) (Douglas J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450
(1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); J. CAm, THE
LAw OF ELECRONIc SuaRvmNcE (1977); F. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); R.
PACKARD, THE NAKE SocIETY (1964); D. ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969); A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) [hereinafter cited as WEsTIN]; Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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analysis Therefore, when this right is weighed against the theoretically abstract intrusion caused by electronic tracking devices, the
scales of justice require substantive guidelines if a just equilibrium
is to be achieved. To date, courts have failed to formulate rational
bases to support their decisions regarding the legal status of electronic tracking devices. This lack of precise standards is manifested
in the incompatible decisions reached by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in electronic tracking cases involving similar facts. Further,
when the Eighth Circuit was confronted with the same constitutional issue, it recognized the difficult nature' of this issue, but
avoided rendering a decision.
Because of the failure of the courts to establish necessary guidelines, there is an urgent need for, and this Note will attempt to
provide, a general framework which delineates and analyzes constitutionally defined privacy interests relevant to the use of electronic
tracking devices by government agencies.'
7. Comment, Assault Upon Solitude-A Remedy?, 11 SArrA CLARA LAw. 109, 110 (1970);
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?,
64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dixon]; see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); WESTIN, supra note 6, at 7.
8. United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1976).
9. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 251020 (1970)) is the primary federal constraint on the use of electronic surveillance techniques
in criminal investigations. It focuses particularly on the utilization of any device which
involves an interception of wire communications. The core requirement of the statute is a
court order authorizing government involvement in electronic surveillance activities.
Therefore, because of Title 111, the question arises whether the use of electronic tracking
devices without a court order is prohibited. Insight into this inquiry is provided by looking
to the definitions contained in Title III, because any activity not encompassed within its
definitions is not prohibited.
Section 2510(4) of the Act defines interception as "the aural acquisition of the contents of
any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." (Emphasis added). An aural acquisition involves the sense of hearing, and implies
that the information aurally acquired be capable of meaningful interpretation. Therefore,
while an argument might be made that the operator of an electronic tracking device acquires
aural information by listening to the tone bursts emitted by the beeper, the tone bursts
themselves contain nothing intelligible. The operator must take further sensory and logical
steps to interpret the message conveyed by the beeps.
Thus, the information acquired through a beeper does not involve the contents of any "oral
communication," and therefore beepers are not prohibited under the purview of "interception
of aural communications." However, Title III's definition of "wire communication" must be
analyzed before concluding that beepers do not fall within the constraints of Title I.
Under section 2510(1) the term "wire communication" is defined as:
any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and point of reception, furnished or operated by any
person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities. ...
Although the legislative history of Title III emphasized the comprehensive reach of the term
wire communication," Title III applies only to the "interception" of communications.
Hence, the information collected by an electronic tracking device is not subject to Title III
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The formula established by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States0 has become the foundation for legal analysis in cases involving privacy considerations. It can be stated as follows: "wherever an
individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' . . . he
is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.""
Although the basic logic of this formula is apparent, courts too often
have applied it without an in-depth understanding of the terms
"reasonable expectation of privacy" and "unreasonable government
intrusion." Courts have applied this same constitutional test to similar facts, yet conflicting results have been reached because these
concepts are so elusive. Thus, these terms must be defined before
one can constitutionally analyze the situation of warrantless use of
electronic tracking devices.
since electronic tracking devices convey data pertaining to location and movement of the
tracked object and not to any form of "interception of wire communications."
Although the electronic tracking device is not subject to Title HI regulation by definition,
confusion still exists concerning warrantless use of the device. Law enforcement personnel
have been reluctant to use such devices without some type of prior judicial approval. Report
of the U.S. National Commission For the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC Report].
Since firm legislative guidelines have not been established, a warrant under Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is often sought by law enforcement agents before installing one of these devices, although Rule 41, which governs the issuance of warrants, does not
encompass the kind of investigative technique involved in the use of this device.
In recognition of the problem surrounding the need for court authorization, the National
Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance recommended an amendment to Title m or a revision of state or federal
rules of criminal procedure to resolve this dilemma. NWC Report, supra, at 18. Advocates
for more comprehensive control of electronic surveillance have attempted on three occasions
to obtain passage of a Bill of Rights Procedures Act, which would require federal agents to
obtain a court order before conducting any form of surveillance on a private citizen. SUBCOMM.
ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 42. However, despite the application of Rule 41 to the use
of electronic tracking devices, and despite the desires of some to include these devices under
newly proposed laws, electronic tracking devices are not prohibited under any current legislation.
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit
wagering information in violation of federal law. FBI agents, acting without a warrant, had
attached electronic listening and recording devices. The government argued that this activity
did not violate the petitioner's fourth amendment rights because the public telephone booth
was a public place. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the purpose of
the fourth amendment was to protect individual people, rather than particular places, from
unreasonable intrusions. A good discussion of the ruling in Katz may be found in Note, The
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REv.
468 (1976).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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The Concept of Privacy

Justice Black's statement that privacy "like a chameleon, has a
different color for every turning,' 2 vividly portrays the broad spectrum of expectations associated with privacy. The use of privacy as
an analytical tool lacks discriminatory, descriptive, and predictive
qualities. As a concept, it has been recognized since Biblical times,'
yet it continues to elude twentieth century interpreters of constitutional law." As a value, it has been termed the major component of
the "American Dream,"' 5 although there is no consensus as to what
it encompasses and how it should be protected. As a philosophy,
privacy has not been universally recognized as a "natural right."'"
As a right, it has no textual basis in the Constitution, yet it permeates the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. 7 As a
definition, it fails to provide necessary standards, yet repeated rulings in constitutional and common law uphold the right to privacy.'"
When such an abstraction is the operative concept used to measure the extent of one's legal right to be free from investigative police activities, a viable definition of privacy is mandated; one that
12. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
13. Adam's recognition of his nakedness, after eating of the forbidden fruit and his consequent shame is an acknowledgment that his privacy had been violated. See Konvitz, Privacy
and the Law: A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAW & CONrTEMP. PROB. 272 (1966).
14. See Gavison, Should We Have a "General Right to Privacy" in Israel?, 12 Is. L. REv.
155 (1977). The passage of a Bill of Protection of Privacy Law by Israel is discussed by Dr.
Gavison. The Committee which drafted the bill deliberately refrained from attempting to
define "privacy." Elmon, Comment on the Kahn Committee Report of the Protection of
Privacy, 12 Is. L. REv. 172 (1977). Special emphasis was instead placed on the various
"threats" to privacy which mandated passage of the Bill. See also Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948; and Article 8(1) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. These are two international
attempts to protect privacy.
15. Dixon, supra note 7.
16. Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAW & CoN'rEMP. PROB. 319
(1966).
17. The first amendment protects freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly; the
third amendment forbids the quartering of troops; the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth amendment prohibits self-incrimination and the ninth
amendment states that the rights enumerated in the Constitution are not to be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people. For an analysis of the "penumbras" of the
ninth amendment, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and related law review
articles, Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965); McKay, The Right of Privacy:
Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1965), Dixon, supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969) (right to privacy in the
home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy in the bedroom);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (right to privacy of the person); York v. Story, 324
F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) (right to privacy of the person);
Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (right to privacy in the home).
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will serve as "a yardstick as accurate as we can make it to tell
what is legally private-that is, protectible as a legal right with
remedies and sanctions-from what is and must be left legally
public-that is, beyond such protections."' 9
The most quoted definition of privacy is that offered by Professor
Warren and Justice Brandeis in their celebrated article of 1890 on
the right to privacy at common law. They defined privacy as "the
right to be let alone."0 Because this definition has the capacity to
be all things to all courts,2" it contains no guidelines that can be
translated into applicable rules.Y
A definition which provides conceptual boundaries and describes
the nature of privacy has recently been proposed. 23 It states that
privacy is "an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal
identity." 4 Thus, prerequisites of autonomy, identity and intimacy
are required before a particular activity of one's life may be legally
termed and protected as private. Identity can be defined as the flow
of information about oneself; autonomy involves the individual's
determination of when, how and to what extent this information is
communicated to others. Intimacy is the key restriction in this definition of privacy because a legislative or judicial judgment must be
made to determine what information is intimate and thus legally
private.
The legal community's selection of protected intimacies must be
made in light of contemporary societal standards and needs. 25 The
26
current pervasive growth of government regulation of private lives
19. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C. R.-C. L. L. Rv. 233, 244 (1977). [hereinafter cited as Gerety].
20. The full context of their definition is: "[f]n very early times, ...
the 'right to life'
served only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom
from actual restraint; . . . now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the
right to be let alone .
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAsv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
21. See, e.g,, Gerety, supra note 19, at 234.
22. As one authority noted, at the most this definition is "a singularly appealing phrase"
that "has charisma." Speech by Hon. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
(New York City, May 11, 1971).
23. Gerety, supra note 19, at 234. His article provides a compendium of privacy definitions
and offers a comprehensive analysis of them.
24. Id. at 236.
25. The need for use of contemporary standards is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
judgment concerning privacy expectations associated with the use of the telephone. As the
use of the telephone evolved from a business luxury to an everyday necessity, the Court's
recognition of privacy interests associated with its use also changed. Its position changed from
non-recognition in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), to recognition and protection in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. It has been reported that "[flederal agencies have 3.8 billion personal records in 6,753
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is an example of an alleged societal "need" which must be weighed
by the courts against its potential for infringing on an intimate
aspect of one's life. Thus, the three co'ncepts of intimacy, identity
and autonomy will help limit and focus 27 application of the Katz test
of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Once a decision has been
reached as to which activities are intimate, the courts will have
charted territory that is legally private and will then be able to
protect this area from unreasonable government intrusions.
The Concept of Search
The question whether a particular government activity constitutes a search is an important one to be answered because a fundamental directive of the fourth amendment under Katz is the prohibition against unreasonable invasions of an individual's privacy by
the government. The paradoxical complexity of this question is best
illustrated by the following metaphor:
[W]e may characterize the zone of privacy as a legal island of
personal autonomy in the midst of a sea of public regulation and
interaction. Coming ashore, to push this metaphor, is normally
forbidden without invitation or good reason. But here the difficulty
with the metaphor, and with its concept of autonomy, become
apparent: for what besides actual physical intrusion by agents of
the state is to constitute a 'coming ashore'?28
Hence, a priori, "unreasonable government intrusion" needs to be
defined so that it may be recognized. A definition of search necessarily involves an examination of the terms used in the fourth amendment. By its terms, the fourth amendment protects the right of the
people to be secure in their "persons, houses and effects."28 While
categories, from passport applications to Social Security accounts .... " This is an average
of 18 files per citizen. Time, July 18, 1977 at 17.
27. See Gerety, supra note 19, at 281-82.
28. Id. at 271.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
30. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
31. One author has aptly expressed this type of "intrusion" in the following terms: "If
government officials could enter my home at whim, they would, I fear, often discover an
unmade bed, unwashed dishes, and various piles of clothing scattered haphazardly about.
Such discoveries may or may not interest them, but I would surely feel exposed and embarrassed. Indeed, I might eventually go so far as to maintain a spotlessly clean home to avoid
the potential exposure and embarrassment." Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment:
Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 1193,
1207.
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the emphasis is on material possessions rather than privacy, the law
has evolved from protection of property to protection of privacy.
The benchmark case of Katz expanded the coverage of fourth
amendment protection to include reasonable expectations of privacy.
Thus, while the concept of search is easily defined and identified
when property interests are involved, it becomes more elusive when
privacy interests are jeopardized. An overt intrusion of privacy, such
as unrestrained police examination of one's person, can be readily
recognized and termed a search.3 But a subtle intrusion, such as
observation of an intimate aspect of one's life, 3' requires reference
to substantive definitions of search and privacy.
Courts have defined search as "a probing or exploration for something that is concealed or hidden." 32 An elaboration of this definition is found in Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Search necessarily implies prying into or uncovering of that
which one has a right to and intends to and effectively does conceal
from view or scrutiny of another." But this definition neither delineates the scope of fourth amendment protections nor provides standards for the resolution of questions of fourth amendment coverage.
The best definition of search was submitted by Professor Anthony
Amsterdam when he stated that "a 'search' is anything that invades
interests protected by the [fourth] amendment." 33 While the interests protected by the fourth amendment are not limited to those
concerning privacy, 34 a reference to the privacy definition enunciated earlier will identify when a particular governmental investigative activity is a "search" of one's privacy25
32. United States v. Haden, 397 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1968); see also State v. Anglada,
144 N.J. Super. 358, 365 A.2d 720 (1976).
33. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 383.
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
35. See text accompanying note 24 supra. Other approaches to the concept of search have
been offered which advocate that a substratum of governmental investigative activity which
falls short of a "full search" be recognized. See, e.g., Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose
and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GEOR. L. REv. 75, 93 (1976);
Grannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out
of the Constitution, 62 VA. L. REv. 1045 (1976); Police Use of Remote Camera Systems For
Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RTs. L. REv. 143 (1972).
Many governmental intrusions have been removed from the realm of judicial control because courts have been unwilling to term certain investigative activity a "search," due to the
consequential sanctions imposed by the exclusionary rule. Using this analytical approach,
admissibility of evidence would depend largely upon the reasonableness of the officers' conduct, rather than upon the often academic question of whether the activity constituted a
search. To determine whether a "full search" or a subsearch has occurred, the individual's
expectation of privacy would still be the prime consideration but would simultaneously be
weighed against both the degree to which the privacy interest was infringed and the societal
need to infringe upon that interest.
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A search affecting privacy is forbidden by the fourth amendment
if it is "unreasonable." Under Katz, a search conducted without a
warrant will be per se unreasonable "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.""
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether a particular
government activity invades privacy interests can be determined by
structuring an analysis within the following framework. The individual's interests relevant to the government's activity must first be
determined. These interests must then be examined to see if they
concern the intimacies of personal identity, and hence are private.
If the relevant interests do not meet this test, then the analysis is
completed, since the government's activity will not infringe any
protected privacy interest and therefore is under no constitutional
restraint. If the interests germane to the government's activity are
found to be intimate to personal identity, they must be recognized
as private. Thus, the government's activity will be constitutionally
prohibited without a warrant based on probable cause.
THE USE OF THE ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICE AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

Courts have disagreed whether the use of an electronic tracking
device is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and
whether, under the principles of Katz v. United States, a warrant
is required. This conflict also exists among the authorities on elec37
tronic surveillance.
Electronic tracking devices have been used in a variety of circumstances. The devices have been inserted in packages, either with the
This sliding scale approach to defining search finds analogous support in the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Camera v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In each of these cases,
the police intrusion was balanced against the need to search. The Court, while assuming a
search had occurred, nevertheless upheld the police activity. The search was termed
"reasonable," and hence not prohibited by the fourth amendment, despite the fact that no
warrants were obtained.
However, it is submitted that use of such a graduated standard, while "easing the strains
of the present monolithic model of the fourth amendment" would permit fourth amendment
analysis to assume the configuration of "one immense Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, supra
note 2, at 393.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357. But see Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 374-77.
37. Professor Blakely and Professor Carr, both members of the United States National
Commission for the Review of State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, have taken opposing positions on the legal status of electronic tracking devices. Professor Blakely advocates use by government agents without the necessity of a warrant, (NWC
Report, supra note 9, at 205). Professor Carr would require prior judicial approval before the
device could be used (Carr, Electronic Beepers, 4 SEA cH AND SEIZURE LAw REPoRT 1, 3 (April,
1977).
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consent of the seller 38 or the owner of the item,19 or upon the discovery of contraband during a customs search. 0 They have been used
with baited money taken in a bank robbery' and with items bart42 These devices are most freered in exchange for contraband.
3
quently used to track vehicles.

However used and wherever placed, installed electronic devices,
or "beepers" enable investigating officers to locate and keep track
of persons and tangible items. Although somewhat obscured in some
opinions, analysis of whether use of an electronic beeper involves a
search requires consideration of the two distinct acts that are necessary to its successful Iuse: installation and monitoring. These acts
present different privacy frameworks depending on the item to
which the device is attached. This Note will undertake an examination of the use of the beeper within two separate contexts: the placement of a beeper on an automobile to track its location and movement, and the installation of the device in tangible items.
TRACKING AUTOMOBILES

The Fifth CircuitApproach
In United Statesi v. Holmes" 1200 pounds of marijuana were
seized with the aid of an electronic tracking device. Without obtaining a warrant, government agents magnetically attached a beeper
to the exterior of the defendant's van while the vehicle was parked
45
in a public parking lot. The defendants, charged with conspiracy
and possession with intent to distribute marijuana," moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrantless attachment
of the device was a search in violation of their fourth amendment
rights. Thus all evidence seized from the van would be subject to
suppression as "fruit of the poisonous tree."' 7 The government
argued that the installation of the beeper was not a search since an
individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
exterior of a vehicle parked on a public parking lot. The government
further contended that an individual's movements while driving a
38.
United
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976);
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976).
United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976).
United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976).
NWC Report, supra note 9, at 205.
521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975) on rehearing,537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1970).
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
521 F.2d 859,863 (5th Cir. 1975). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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vehicle on a public road cannot be considered private.
The district court suppressed the evidence, holding that use of the
tracking device was a search and was subject to the prohibitions of
the fourth amendment. 8 On appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that a search had occurred
when the device was attached to the defendant's van."
The court's perception of the problem was crucial to its attempt
to create a framework for an analysis of a unique legal issue. Its
approach placed less emphasis on the interest to be protected than
on the means of violating it. The court quoted Boyd v. United
States, 0 stating that "the proper focal point for inquiry is whether
the government, [has invaded] an individual's 'right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property' . . . and [whether

this intrusion] violates 'the privacy upon which he justifiably relied."' 5 Purporting to apply this test to the given situation, the
Holmes court concluded that an individual has a justifiable expectation of privacy in his motor vehicle even though that vehicle is
parked in public or driven on a public highway. The panel further
held that this includes the right to expect that the government will
not attach an electronic tracking device to his automobile in order
to monitor his movements. 2
Despite the fact that the court had stated that its focal point
would be to determine an individual's reasonable privacy expectations, in reality it concentrated on the ramifications of the electronic
beeper as a surveillance technique. Thus, the extent of the invasion
to the defendant's "security, liberty and property" was not the basis
of the decision by the court; rather, the method by which the intrusion occurred was pivotal to its ruling.
The court stressed that the beeper is not a surveillance method
of limited time, scope and duration. The clandestine nature of the
device also disturbed the court. Most importantly, the court believed that judicial approval of the warrantless use of beepers would
grant license to government agents to break into trunks or glove
compartments of vehicles or implant the device on one's person. The
court summarized its view of the 5' use
of the tracking device by call3
ing it "obnoxious and repulsive.

Because this was a search and seizure case of "exceptional im48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

521 F.2d at 863.
Id. at 864.
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
521 F.2d at 865.
Id. at 866.

Id.
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portance"' a rehearing en banc was granted. 5 The Fifth Circuit, by
an evenly divided vote, affirmed the lower court's decision that an
illegal search had occurred when the beeper was installed on the
defendant's van.56 A lengthy dissent was submitted.
The dissent focused on whether an exception to the warrant requirement was appropriate in this particular situation. Unlike the
appellate court's analysis, .the dissent framed the crucial issue to be
whether the use of the beeper was reasonable under the circumstances, rather than whether a search had occurred under the Katz
test.57
The dissent concluded that there had not been an illegal search.
Since probable cause was established by "unusually strong facts,"
the use of the beeper was justified. Finding exigent circumstances,
the dissent went one step further, and argued that the warrantless
use of the beeper was reasonable in this situation since the intrusion
was minimal. The dissent stated that an individual should have a
lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle operated in public
because "[a] car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.
It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents
are in plain view." 58 The dissent did not delineate what "degree" a
"lesser expectation" of privacy involved. It left open the question
whether any reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed
by the attachment of the beeper to the vehicle.
The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v.
Hufford.51 In Hufford, an electronic tracking device was installed in
a drum of caffeine that one of the defendants had legally purchased
from a chemical company and placed in his pickup truck. It enabled
state agents to trace the movements of the truck to a rental garage,
where pursuant to a warrant, a second beeper was attached to the
battery of the defendant's truck. With the aid of the second beeper,
the agents were able to locate the truck when it was later moved to
a house. A warrant to search the garage was obtained and the agents
seized paraphernalia used in amphetamine manufacture. The de54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
42 (D.

537 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1976).
525 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1976).
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976) rev'g, sub. nom. United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp.
Ore. 1975).
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fendants moved to suppress this evidence and to quash the search
warrant, contending that the agents invaded constitutionally protected areas of privacy without securing a search warrant. The government countered that the installation of the beeper in the drum
constituted neither a search nor a seizure under the fourth amendment since the driver of the truck could have no reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling on public roads.
The district court held that the placement of the beeper on the
drum was a search.60 Even though the defendant's expectation of
privacy in his movements while driving on public roads was arguably minimal,6 this expectation still constituted a protected right
which the court would "not allow the government to ride roughshod
over." The court found that the government had contradicted its
rationale for the warrantless installation of the first beeper in the
drum, when it sought court orders for the second beeper's installation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sustained the government's contention that there had not been a search under the fourth amendment
since the defendant did not have any reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding his location while traveling on a public road. 3 The
court considered the installation of the beeper to be a "probing
exploratory quest for evidence" but emphasized that the beeper is
a device which "only augments that which can be done by visual
surveillance alone." 4 Therefore, the court concluded that there was
"no distinction between visual surveillance and the use of an electronic beeper [under these circumstances] . . .provided no Fourth

Amendment violation occurred when the beeper was attached. 6 3 In
this court's view, the government had not contradicted itself when
it sought a warrant for the installation of the second beeper on the
defendant's truck. The warrant was a necessary prerequisite for the
beeper's installation as the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy would have been violated if the agents had entered the
garage and opened the truck's hood to plant the beeper on the
battery without a warrant.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether any reasonable
privacy interest had been violated when a beeper was used without
60. United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42 (D. Ore. 1975).
61. Id. The court did not elucidate why the defendant should have had even a minimal
privacy expectation.
62. Id.
63. 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. Id. at 33, 34.
65. Id. at 34.
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a warrant. Use of an electronic tracking device as a surveillance
method was not the key to its analysis. Rather, the court examined
the limited nature of the information conveyed by the beeper and
determined that knowledge of one's movement and location while
traveling on public roads was not something one could reasonably
expect to remain private. The beeper is merely an "appropriate
sophisticated device to aid in a lawful surveillance .
68
The Eighth Circuit'sAnalysis
In United States v. Frazier7 the Eighth Circuit avoided deciding
whether warrantless installation of a beeper on an automobile constitutes a search. In this case, FBI agents were investigating an
ongoing extortion scheme. Time was of the essence in setting up a
continuous surveillance as the identity of the victim was only determined the night before the attempted extortion was to be executed.
The scheme involved placing an explosive belt on the victim. Consequently, FBI agents decided that immediate and warrantless installation on the defendant's automobile to trace his movements was
essential. The court characterized this action as a search without
further discussion of the issue. However, the search was termed
"reasonable" because the installation was justified by probable
cause and exigent circumstances.
Noting that the issue of whether an illegal search had occurred
presented a "difficult question,""8 the court determined that "[alt
a minimum, the attachment of such a device, without consent or
judicial authorization, is an actual trespass." 69 It also expressed
concern that approving the warrantless attachment of the beeper
would encourage indiscriminate planting of tracking devices on
cars.70 In a concurring opinion, Judge Ross approved the placement
of the beeper using the same rationale found in United States v.
Hufford.71 He found the case similar to Cardwell v. Lewis" where a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that taking paint scrapings
from the exterior of vehicles in public parking lots did not infringe
reasonable expectations of privacy. Judge Ross urged that the issue
of warrantless attachment of beepers should have been squarely
addressed by the court, as the issue was an important and recurring
66.

Id.

67.
68.

538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1324.

69.

Id.

70.
71.
72.

Id.
539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976)..
417 U.S. 583 (1974).
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one. He emphasized the need to give direction to district courts,
prosecutors and law enforcement authorities.
The Need for Direction
The need for direction is aptly demonstrated by the divergent
paths taken by the courts in their efforts to frame and resolve the
issue of the constitutionality of warrantless use of beepers by government agents. In most cases, courts characterize warrantless installation as a search without considering whether privacy interests
are infringed by this police activity.73 A case in point is United
States v. Bobisink,7' where the distrit court structured a "future
shock" framework that closely parallels the approach taken by the
court in United States v. Holmes. 5 While not calling the device
"obnoxious and repulsive," it viewed the beeper as a conceivable
"prelude to sanctioning a '1984' network of such beepers connected
to a master monitoring station which would keep track of each of
our movements for the benefit of the powers that be." 76
This decision is particularly notable for its lack of legal foundation. Legal assumptions, which form the backbone of its decision,
were made without reference to any legal authority.
The better reasoned approach to the resolution of the dilemma
was taken by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hufford." The
conceptual approach framed by the court was the same as the model
proposed by this Note.7" The court focused initially on the privacy
interests relevant to the attachment and monitoring of beepers on
automobiles. The court found that the interest or information involved was a person's location and movement while driving a vehicle
on public roads. The court then concluded that it was unreasonable
to expect such information to be private. Had the court utilized the
privacy definition discussed earlier,7" it could have stated the same
conclusion by saying one's location and movement while traveling
on public highways are not interests intimate to personal identity.
The court then examined the beeper as a surveillance technique and
found that it would only provide a more efficient method to obtain
73. United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bergdoll,
412 F. Supp. 1323, 1338 (D. Del. 1976); Fotianos v. State. 329 S.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1976).
74. 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976).
75. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975).
76. Id. See also United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976) for a further
elaboration of this holding.
77. 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
78. See text acompanying note 24 supra.
79. Id.
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information about a non-private aspect of an individual's life.80 By
approving the warrantless use of the beeper in this case, the court
emphasized that it would not grant carte blanche approval of all
warrantless beeper installations. Rather, their approach would
mandate a finding that a search had occurred whenever reasonable
privacy expectations had been infringed by installation of the device.
The court's conclusion that protected privacy interests do not
exist when a person is traveling in his vehicle on public highways is
well supported by case law and logic. There is a legally recognized
lack of privacy while traveling in motor vehicles on public highways.8" The halting and inspection of vehicles to regulate traffic and
enforce speeding, vehicle, and driving laws must be expected while
traveling."2 Indeed, pedestrians have a more reasonable expectation
3
of unobserved movement.
Thus, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy on public highways where a car is publicly visible for anyone's observation. This
is consistent with the view espoused in Katz that "[wihat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 8' In an automobile,
one is surrounded by glass that allows visual surveillance by all who
care to look. Police officers are allowed-indeed they are expected-to patrol and observe what transpires in these areas visible
to the public.
Mere observation is not a search,85 and the fact that the information is acquired through mechanically assisted investigation is a
distinction without a difference. Plain view observation with sense80. For a contrary analysis, see Comment, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Attachment of Tracking Device to Automobile Constitutes a Search Subject to Fourth
Amendment, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 514 (1976); Note, Tracking Katz, Beepers, Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 86 Yale L.J. 1461 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
82. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 188 (1949).
83. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 839
(1974).
84. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). Several state and federal courts of appeal have taken a similar
position, where the issue concerned the "knowing" exposure of an automobile on public
highways. See United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. United
States, 367 A.2d 1316 (D.C. App. 1977).
85. State v. Matthews, 217 Kan. 654, 538 P.2d 637 (1976); see also Lewis & Mannle,
WarrantlessSearches and the "Plain View" Doctrine: CurrentPerspective, 12 CRiM. L. BULL.
5 (1976).
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enhancing aids has been upheld consistently by the courts. 8 The
only time use of these aids transform the observation into a search
is when there could be no actual "plain" view of the observed object
without the aid of a sense-enhancing device.87
The conclusion reached in Holmes that an individual has a right
to expect that the government will not attach a beeper to his vehicle
to trace his movements is without merit. Warrantless attachment
of electronic beepers involves no greater intrusion than that involved in physical surveillance by the police. Simply because the
government uses a more sophisticated device to aid it in its lawful
activity does not enlarge an individual's privacy rights. At most it
is a technical trespass. The constitutional implications of this kind
of trespass to the exterior of automobiles is underscored by two
8 valirecent Supreme Court decisions. South Dakota v. Opperman"
dated police inventory of the contents of impounded vehicles. In
Cardwell v. Lewis89 the Court held that taking paint scrapings from
cars was not a search. In accordance with these holdings, two federal
circuit courts have held that opening car doors to ascertain the
vehicle identification numbers is not a search." It follows from these
decisions that the magnetic attachment of a beeper to the exterior
of automobiles is constitutionally insignificant.
The Holmes and Bobisink decisions were in large measure
grounded on the fear that approval of warrantless installation of
beepers would lead to other, more objectionable, practices. The
courts emphasized that such activity could become a prelude to
implanting beepers on clothing or hiding agents in automobile
trunks. However, these fears are without legal foundation and are
not a proper basis on which to rest a decision. There is a significant
difference between the privacy reasonably associated with the exterior of automobiles and the privacy related to one's person or one's
locked car trunk. Several courts have held that the trunk is the area
of a vehicle in which one has the greatest actual expectation of
privacy. Although "plainly visible" portions of the car may be
searched without a warrant under a variety of situations, independent justification has consistently been required before a trunk may
86. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973) for a comprehensive survey.
87. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Ha. 1976).
88. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
89. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
90. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011
(1972); see also United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
888 (1973).
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be searched." Further, planting a beeper on a person's clothing
would clearly violate the right to bodily privacy.2
It is also contended that the continuous surveillance aspect of the
beeper is a factor which should weigh heavily in the decision of its
legal status. The assertion in Holmes that the beeper is a device of
unlimited time, scope and duration is inaccurate." The batteries in
a beeper have a limited life and the scope of the device's function
is limited to tracking the location of objects. No further information
can be obtained since the device is non-aural and merely replaces
the "eyes" of the police in a more efficient manner.9 '
91. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973), where, the court held that
if the only justification for the search of the car was the bare police custody of the car, the
seizure of a gun from the locked trunk of the car was improper. Although the Supreme Court
in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), held that the securing of the contents of
a lawfully impounded motor vehicle did not constitute a search, it is unlikely that this holding
will be expanded in the future to cover police entry into a locked glove compartment or trunk.
Opening a locked portion of a vehicle in police custody would not serve any police caretaking
function nor any self-protection function. See Hermann, Inventory Searches of Vehicles, 3
SEARCH AND SEizuRE LAw REoPRT 1-3 (1976). See also Barrentine v. United States, 434 F.2d
636 (9th Cir. 1970) (search of trunk of car where defendant was arrested for drunk driving
held invalid); and People v. Super. Ct. In And For Los Angeles Cty., 63 Cal. App.3d 990, 134
Cal. Rptr. 174 (1976) (trunk of automobile recognized as an area of a vehicle as to which there
is greatest expectation of privacy, hence independent justification required before trunk may
be searched).
92, See, e.g., Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Relf v. Weinberger,
372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972).
93. The inaccuracy of this conclusion is demonstrated by an understanding of the mechanical components and function of the electronic beeper. An electronic tracking device
utilizes radio direction finding (RDF) in providing covert tracking of vehicles and cargo. A
radio receiver and a beacon transmitter are required for the tracking operation. The placement of a beacon transmitter on the target vehicle or in cargo containers is required. The
beacon will emit periodic signals (radio frequency "tone bursts") to be received by a radio
receiver tuned to its frequency. The location of the tracked object is established by the
audible tone picked up by the receiver and/or a left-right needle indicator which points the
way to the target and indicates its relative motion to the operator of the receiver.
The beacon transmitter units commonly measure 2 x 5 x 3 inches including battery pack.
They have an average signal output of 50 milliwatts to one watt and operate, depending upon
the duty cycle or frequency of signal transmission, for 10 to 100 hours.
The range of the "bumper beeper" depends on the environment in which it is used. In an
open environment the surface-to-surface range is one to three miles; in the center city environment where much radio frequency shielding is encountered, the range may be only a few
city blocks. Surface-to-air ranges of 50 to 100 miles are possible if no radio frequency shielding
inhibits the beacon transmission or the tracking aircraft's reception.
Proficient use of the electronic tracking system is directly related to operator skill and
experience. Performance and quality substantially degrades when the system is used in a
high-rise city environment. Multiple signal reflections from buildings and the constantly
changing propagation paths between the tracked and the tracking vehicle can reduce the
usefulness of the device to virtually nil. Thus, a fair reading of the above data leads to the
conclusion that the electronic beeper is a device of limited time, scope and duration. See
generally NWC Report, supra note 9, at 204-05.
94. Even this analogy is not technically correct. A police officer's eyes have a much greater
capacity for surveillance, i.e., through visual surveillance an officer can later identify the
tracked person. He can also "observe" conversations. See generally note 93 supra.
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Finally, any possible abuse of beepers is limited. Just as physical
surveillance, while normally of unquestioned legality, 5 may become
harassment, it is possible that indiscriminate use of beepers could
involve the same elements of harassment. When unaided surveillance becomes harassment, courts grant injunctive relief." The
same relief from indiscriminate use of beepers also would be available. Another conceivable remedy is recovery of damages from government agents who violate fourth amendment rights.9 7
INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC BEEPERS WITHIN TANGIBLE ITEMS

In automobile attachment cases, the method of beeper installation is critical to constitutional considerations because monitoring
itself does not infringe privacy interests." The same is not necessarily true when the beeper is placed within personal property. When
a beeper is implanted inside an object and that object is subsequently taken inside a home by the individual under investigation,
the device enables the government to acquire information not otherwise publicly available. The use of the beeper as a "Trojan horse"
reveals location and movement which an individual can reasonably
expect to be "hidden" or sheltered by his home. The device also
allows government agents to know when a subject opens a tracked
object." It is this penetration power of the Trojan horse beeper
which makes the monitoring of the device the "more significant
judicially cognizable event."I1a The Trojan horse beeper is a more
dangerous threat to privacy interests than any comparable senseenhancing device because the mere drawing of one's drapes can
effectively counter any artificial visual amplification device; there
is no available defense against Trojan horse intrusions. Indeed, even
a fortress of visual protection, a windowless home, situated on an
extensive area of land and surrounded by high fences 0' would fall
95. There has been no litigation in this area.
96. See Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1964) (Swygert, J., dissenting)
and Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
97. An excellent discussion of this remedy in both theory and application may be found
in Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14
Am. CraM. L. Rv. 245 (1976). See also Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977).
98. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
99. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (lst Cir. 1976). In this case it was
explained that the signal which the beeper emitted would be altered when the tracked package was opened.
100. United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
101. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 63, 72 (1974) and Note, United States v.
Santana; A Reinterpretation of the Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, 55 No.
CAR. L. Rav. 665, 673 (1977).
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to a Trojan horse invasion. Thus, the sanctum sanctorum of fourth
amendment privacy protection might be violated by warrantless use
of Trojan horse beepers. However, courts could decide that the information acquired by this device is non-private and that the sheltering of this information within a home does not transform it into
a privacy interest, since location and movement alone are not intimate nor concerned with personal identity. If this were the case,
monitoring a Trojan horse beeper would not be a search for fourth
amendment purposes. However, the issue is unresolved and awaits
judicial determination.
Even though monitoring Trojan horse beepers is the "more significant judicially cognizable event," the act of installation cannot be
ignored. All courts have agreed that the placing of a beeper inside
a vehicle 01 2 or a closed package'013 is a search. This activity encompasses a classic search definition, i.e., "a prying into of that which
one has a right to and intends to conceal from view or scrutiny of
another."'0 4 However, if the tracked object is contraband or an item
used in criminal activity, installation in these items presents no
constitutional problems, as an individual can have no property or
privacy interests in contraband.'0 5 Since the government can
"absolutely seize the contraband, the lesser act of inserting the
tracking devices must necessarily be permissible."'" Likewise, when
a beeper is placed inside movable property constituting a part of
illegal transactions, no privacy interests can be invaded because
there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning items
illegally acquired.
CONCLUSION

A dichotomy exists in the legal status of warrantless use of electronic tracking devices by government agents because courts have
not been able to consistently articulate and address the relevant
privacy considerations. This Note has proposed an analytical framework to resolve this conflict that utilizes viable definitions of privacy
and search. The individual interests relevant to the installation and
102. See United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976) and People v. Smith, 67
Cal. App. 3d 38, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
103. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888-89 (lst Cir. 1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Mass. 1976); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800,
803 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
104. FD. R. CaM. P. 62(c).
105. See Leary v. United States, 544 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v.
Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969). The courts rejected the contention that private possession of contraband drugs was protected by the same right of privacy which permitted adults
to examine pornography in private. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
106. United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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monitoring of electronic beepers must be examined to determine if
these interests are private. If these interests cannot be judicially
recognized as intimate to personal identity, then use of the electronic beeper is constitutionally permissible.
When the electronic beeper is used to track vehicles, the relevant
individual interests are the location and movement of the tracked
subject while traveling public highways. These interests or information are not private since they are not germane to the intimacies of
personal identity. Hence, use of the beeper to track automobiles
should not be considered a search. When this device is used as a
Trojan horse to enable government agents to acquire information
not publicly available, the question of the intimacy of the information acquired must be judicially resolved.
KARA L. CooK

